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Abstract
Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium
theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games,
it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong
cooperation assumption. Furthermore, in practice, this cooperation
assumption is simply unrealistic.
1. Introduction
One of the major divides in Game Theory is between cooperative and
non-cooperative games. And as it happened along the development of
that theory around the times of World War II, the idea emerged that,
in certain important ways, non-cooperative games are more basic than
the cooperative ones. In a few words, the thinking leading to that idea
could be formulated as follows. A cooperative game between n ≥ 2
players, if it is to be nontrivial, must leave each player some freedom,
no matter which may be the binding agreements of the respective co-
operation. And then, if one focuses on the respective freedom of each
of the players, one may obtain a game which is like a non-cooperative
one.
The difficulty with such a argument is that games, be they cooperative
or non-cooperative, can be utterly complex. And to mention but one
such aspect of complexity, let us recall that many games prove to be
1
algorithmically unsolvable, Binmore [1-3].
A consequence of the significant complexities involved in games is that
it may not always be so easy to separate or subtract the cooperative
part of a game, in order to remain with a game which may be consid-
ered as being non-cooperative. In other words, the formula
game ≡ non− cooperative game (modulo cooperation)
does not in general hold. Therefore, one is not justified in seeing non-
cooperative games as being more basic than the cooperative ones.
Regardless of the above, one may note that the centrality in Game
Theory of the Nash-equilibrium theorem about non-cooperative games
is due not in a small measure to a certain tacit or lingering acceptance
of the above incorrect formula.
The aim of this paper, however, is not so much about the clarifica-
tion of the place of the Nash-equilibrium theorem with Game Theory,
but rather to show that, no matter how much that theorem is seen as
a non-cooperative paradigm, it does essentially depend on an assump-
tion which requires such a strong cooperation, as to render it unrealistic
from practical point of view.
Before going further, it may be useful to recall in short certain for-
mative moments in the evolution of modern Game Theory, moments
which may shed a light upon the mentioned views relating to the di-
vide between cooperative and non-cooperative games.
Game theory, as initiated by John von Neumann, see von Neumann
& Morgenstern, centers around the individual and aims to lead to a
rational outcome when two or more individuals interact in well defined
situations and do so, however, without the interference of an overall
authority. The very development since the 1920s of the mathemati-
cal theory of games is in itself an act of rational behaviour, albeit on
a certain meta-level, which involves both the levels of the interest in
developing the general concepts, axioms, theorems, and so on, as well
as the levels at which they are put to their effective uses in a variety
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of relevant applications.
And yet, such a meta-rational behaviour appears to have mostly come
to a halt when dealing with cooperation.
Instead, the effort has rather been focused upon non-cooperative con-
texts, and rationality got thus limited to them. A further aggravation
of such a limitation upon rationality has come from the fact that co-
operation is so often being associated with issues of ethics, morality,
wisdom, philosophy, or on the contrary, politics, or mere expediency.
One of the few more prominent contributions to cooperation has been
the 1984 study of Robert Axelrod, which however is limited to two
person non zero sum games, and it centers around one of the sim-
plest nontrivial such examples, namely, the celebrated game called
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, suggested in the early 1950s by Merrill Flood
and Melvin Drescher, and formalized by Albert W Tucker, see Axel-
rod, Rasmusen.
However, even such simplest nontrivial examples can show that coop-
eration itself is often but a most natural matter of rationality, albeit
manifested in more evolved forms. Indeed, in many non-cooperative
situations what can be obtained by those involved proves to be signif-
icantly less than what may be available through suitable cooperation.
Thus the choice of cooperation need not at all be seen as merely a
matter which has to do with expediency, politics, wisdom, morality or
ethics.
And then the issue is simply the following : do we limit rationality
and stop it before considering cooperation in ways more adequate to
its considerable depth and potential, or instead, are we ready to try
to be rational all the way ?
And the fact is that very few situations are of a nature in which com-
petition or conflict is total, and total to the extent that there simply
cannot be any place whatsoever for one or another form of coopera-
tion.
In game theory such a situation corresponds to extreme cases such as
the two person zero sum game.
In rest, that is, in the vast majority of cases, the possibilities for coop-
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eration and its considerable rewards may often be there. And then, all
it takes is to extend and deepen rationality, and thus find and develop
suitable ways of cooperation.
Needless to say, cooperative games are by no means less complex than
the non-cooperative ones. Therefore, one can expect yet another rea-
son why attention may focus more on the latter, and why one may try
to reduce the former to them.
However, as follows from Binmore [1-3], this limitation of rationality
mostly to the study of noncooperative games is still leading to com-
plexities which are not algorithmically solvable.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s when game theory appears to
have known its period of most massive development, there was not
much awareness about the possibility of the presence of the type of
deep difficulties which would more than three decades later be pointed
out by Binmore.
In such a context, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the so called
”Nash Program” emerged which aimed to reduce cooperative games
to non-cooperative ones, see Nash [1,3].
There is, however, a rather weighty reason, explanation, and maybe
also excuse, for the fact that the Nash Program has known a certain
popularity, and that its hoped for aim does not seem so easy to set
aside. Namely, as is well known even from common everyday expe-
rience, cooperation will often involve considerable complications and
difficulties. First of all, and already on its most basic conceptual levels,
cooperation proves to be an extremely complex and rich phenomenon,
which therefore cannot in any way be encompassed by a few general
definitions and mathematical models. This fact is indeed in sharp con-
trast with the modelling of competition and conflict situations, where
for instance in Game Theory, the so called non-cooperative games,
see (2.1) and (2.5) below, describe quite well - and do so in spite of
their manifest simplicity - a considerably large class of such situations.
Second, one can only talk about cooperation if one can rely on the re-
spective agreements undertaken by the autonomous agents involved.
And the issue of such a reliance clearly depends on a variety of com-
plex factors which can easily be outside of the realms of convenient
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mathematical modelling.
Be it as it may, one should not forget that, just like in the case of
competition and conflict, the primary aspect of cooperation is intent,
while the respective subsequent conceptualizations, models and ac-
tions are only specific instances of manifestation and expression of
such an intent. Therefore, the primary issue is whether we intend to
have competition or conflict in a context which may preferably include
cooperation as well, or on the contrary, we intend, because of no mat-
ter what reasons, to relegate cooperation to a secondary role, or even
exclude it altogether.
And if we do not a priori intend to exclude cooperation, then we should
be careful not to allow that it is excluded merely by default, that is,
simply due to the fact that it is in general not so easy to deal with it,
be it conceptually, or practically, and thus it simply happens that we
fail, avoid or decline to make use of it.
And a readiness to pursue rational behaviour beyond its non-coopertive
limits will then suggest that the intent to cooperate, and even more
importantly, the intent to secure and keep up in the longer run a con-
text suitable for cooperation is but a clearly rational behaviour, even
if on a certain meta-level.
The effect of the presence of such considerable difficulties related to
cooperation has been that the modelling of cooperation has not re-
ceived enough attention, see Axelrod.
As is well known, Nash himself tended to see Game Theory as being
mainly moved by competition, conflict, and so on, rather than by co-
operation, see Nasar.
On the other hand, the older and much more experienced John von
Neumann, the originator of modern Game Theory, considered that
there was a major and urgent need in economics, and other important
human ventures involving strategic thinking, for the introduction of
rational approaches to the respective variety of human interactions
involved. And clearly, the very attempts to rationalize approaches to
competition, conflict, and so on, rather tend to mollify, than prioritize
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them, see Neumann & Morgenstern.
As it happened, the first major result in Game Theory was obtained
by John von Neumann in his 1928 paper. This is the famous Min-Max
theorem about two player zero sum games. Such games involve the
smallest possible nontrivial number of players, and the sharpest pos-
sible conflict among them, in which what one player wins, the other
one must lose, thus the sum of what is won and lost is always zero.
Clearly, in such a game there is no way for cooperation.
Here it is important to note the following. During the period around
1928, when von Neumann was only 25 years old, he was involved in
at least two other major ventures, namely, the foundation of Set The-
ory, and the foundation of Quantum Mechanics, and in both of them
he made most important and lasting contributions. In this way, von
Neumann’s involvement in Game Theory during that period can be
seen as reflecting the special, if not in fact, fundamental importance
he attributed to it. And indeed, he saw it as being the first ever sys-
tematic and rigorous theoretical approach to a rational management
of conflict and competition between two or more conscious agents.
Problems of optimization had been considered earlier as well. After
all, optimization appears as a rather permanent human concern in a
most diverse range of activities. However, such problems could typi-
cally be seen as a game with one single conscious and rational player
who was playing against Nature, or against everybody else.
But now, in von Neumann’s view, the task was to be able to build an
appropriate theory for conflicts and competitions between a number of
conscious agents, assuming that they are firmly and reliably grounded
in rationality.
It should be remembered in this regard that von Neumann happened
to grow up in the Empire of Austria-Hungary, and did so during the
disastrous years of World War I and its aftermath. And just like
the well known philosopher Karl Popper, of the same generation and
background, von Neumann was much influenced by the prevailing view
during the post World War I years, a view according to which that
war - called The Great War - had been the result of nothing else but
systematic and catastrophic, even if rather trivial, failures of rational-
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ity on the part of the leading elites of the Western powers.
The extend to which von Neumann gave a special priority to the devel-
opment of Game Theory is further illustrated by his activity during the
next one and a half decade, till the publishing in 1944, that is, during
World War II, of his joint book with Morgenstern, entitled ”Theory of
Games and Economic Behaviour”. Indeed, during the years of World
War II, von Neumann was heavily involved in supporting the Ameri-
can war effort and doing so in a variety of ways. Consequently, at the
time, he did very little theoretical research. And yet, he considered it
important enough to dedicate time to Game Theory, and complete the
mentioned book of over 600 pages, which is the first ever systematic
and detailed presentation of that theory. It should also be mentioned
that the theory in the book is due solely to von Neumann, and most
of it, except for his Min-Max theorem of 1928, was developed by him
during the years preceding its first publication in 1944. Morgenstern
was an economist, and his contribution to the book consisted in the
connections between game theory and economic behaviour. In this
way, that book can in fact be seen as a research monograph in Game
Theory.
As for the relevance of its content, a good deal of it still makes useful
reading after more than six decades.
The importance attributed to Game Theory continued after World
War II as well. And it was to a good extent due to the interest man-
ifested in it by the RAND Corporation, a most influential California
think tank at the time, which was heavily involved, among others, in
strategic studies related to the just emerged Cold War.
As it happens, Emile Borel initiated in the early 1920s the study of
certain well known card games which were related to the two person
zero sum games. However, he did not obtain the respective major
result, and in fact, he assumed that the Min-Max theorem was in gen-
eral false. Later, in 1934, R A Fisher was also involved in a study
of two person zero sum games, without however obtaining the major
Min-Max theorem, see Luce & Raiffa.
Then starting in 1950, John Nash, who at the time was 22 years
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old, published his fundamental papers Nash [1,3] on equilibrium in
n-person non-cooperative games, and his main result was a significant
extension of the Min-Max theorem of von Neumann.
Nash has also published important results in cooperative games, see
Nash [2,4].
However, as it happened, the Nash-equilibrium theorem massively ex-
tended the von Neumann Min-Max theorem, and it does so in two
ways. First, it is no longer restricted to two players, and instead, it
can handle an arbitrary number of them. Second, it is no longer re-
stricted to zero sum games, but it refers to arbitrary non zero sum
ones.
Furthermore, the Nash-equilibrium theorem has ever since its incep-
tion remained the best known result of its kind, as it has not been
further extended in any significant manner, when considered in its
own terms of non-cooperation.
Consequently, that theorem has always been seen as paradigmatic for
non-cooperative games.
To a certain extent, such an interpretation is not so surprising due
to the following two facts. First, the Nash result on the existence
of an equilibrium in mixed strategies is an obvious extension of the
corresponding von Neumann Min-Max theorem, and the latter, as
mentioned, is indeed about games which are outside of any possible
cooperation. Second, as long as one is limited to the usual, and thus
narrow concepts of cooperation, the result of Nash on equilibrium will
be seen as falling outside of such concepts.
As we shall show in section 2, however, such an interpretation can
only hold if alone the usual, and indeed narrow concepts of cooper-
ation are considered. And as the very concept of equilibrium in the
Nash result implies it, that result can have any practical meaning and
value at all, and do so beyond its particular case when only two play-
ers are involved, only if the respective n ≥ 3 players do accept - even
if implicitly - certain additional common rules of behaviour. Thus in
the case of n ≥ 3 players, they must end up by cooperating, even if
in ways other and more deep than those according to the usual views
of cooperation. And in fact, the kind of cooperation needed in order
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to enable the Nash-equilibrium concept and result to function at all
proves to be so strong as to be practically unrealistic.
Due to the reputation of von Neumann, the interest he showed in
Game Theory led in the late 1940s and early 1950s to a considerable
status for that theory among young mathematicians at Princeton, see
Nasar. That status was further enhanced by results such as those of
Nash and others.
There was also at the time a significant interest in Game Theory out-
side of academe. As mentioned, for instance, the well known RAND
Corporation was conducting studies in political and military strategy
which were modelled by a variety of games.
As it happened, however, soon after, certain major setbacks were ex-
perienced. First, and within game theory itself, was the fact that
in the case of n-person games, even for n ≥ 3 moderately large, there
appeared to be serious conceptual difficulties related to reasonable con-
cepts of solution. Indeed, too many such games proved not to have
solutions in the sense of various such solution concepts, concepts which
seemed to be natural, see Luce & Raiffa, Owen, Vorob’ev, Rasmusen.
Later, the nature and depth of these conceptual difficulties got signifi-
cantly clarified. For instance, in Binmore [1-3] it was shown that there
are no Turing machines which could compute general enough games.
In other words, solving games is not an algorithmically feasible prob-
lem.
The second major trouble came from outside of Game Theory, and it is
not quite clear whether at the time it was soon enough appreciated by
game theorists with respect to its possible implications about the fun-
damental difficulties in formulating appropriate concepts of solutions
in games. Namely, Kenneth Arrow showed that a set of individual
preferences cannot in general, and under reasonable conditions, be ag-
gregated into one joint preference, unless there is a dictator who can
impose such a joint preference. This result of Arrow was in fact ex-
tending and deepening the earlier known, so called, voter’s paradox,
mentioned by the Marquis de Condorcet, back in 1785, see Mirkin.
In subsequent years, developments in Game Theory lost much of their
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momentum. In later years, applications of Game Theory gained the
interest of economists, and led to a number of new developments in
economic theory. An indication of such developments was the found-
ing in 1989 of the journal Games and Economic Behavior.
At the same time certain studies of competition, conflict, and so on,
were taken up by the developments following Arrow’s fundamental pa-
per, and led to social, collective or group choice theory, among others.
Decision Theory got also involved in such studies involving certain
specific instances of competition, conflict or cooperation, related to
problems of optimization, see Rosinger [1-6].
In games, or in social, collective or group choice one has many au-
tonomous players, participants or agents involved, each of them with
one single objective, namely, to maximize his or her advantage which
usually is defined by a scalar, real valued utility function. And by the
early 1950s it became clear enough that such a situation would not be
easy to handle rationally, even on a conceptual level.
On the other hand, a main objective of Decision Theory is to enable
one single decision maker who happens to have several different, and
usually, quite strongly conflicting objectives. And in view of Arrow’s
result, such a situation may at first appear to be more easy to deal
with. The situation, however, proves to be quite contrary to such a
first perception, see Rosinger [1-6].
As it turned out, games, social choice or decision making, each have
their deeper structural limitations.
And as far as games are concerned, not even in the case of the cele-
brated and paradigmatic non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium theorem is
it possible to escape the paradox of having the validity of that result
essentially based on a cooperative assumption so strong as to make it
unrealistic in practice.
2. The Nash-Equilibrium Theorem
The usual way an n-person non-cooperative game in terms of the play-
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ers’ pure strategies is defined is by
(2.1) G = (P, (Si | i ∈ P ), (Hi | i ∈ P ))
Here P is the set of n ≥ 2 players, and for every player i ∈ P , the
finite set Si is the set of his or her pure strategies, while Hi : S −→ R
is the payoff of that player. Here we denoted by
(2.2) S =
∏
i∈P Si
the set of all possible aggregate pure strategies s = (si | i ∈ P ) ∈ S
generated by the independent and simultaneous individual strategy
choices si of the players i ∈ P .
The game proceeds as follows. Each player i ∈ P can freely choose
an individual strategy si ∈ Si, thus leading to an aggregate strategy
s = (si | i ∈ P ) ∈ S. At that point, each player i ∈ P receives the
payoff Hi(s), and the game is ended. We assume that each player tries
to maximize his or her payoff.
Remark 1
The usual reason the games in (2.1) are seen as non-cooperative is as
follows. Each of the n ≥ 2 players i ∈ P can completely independently
of any other player in P choose any of his or her available strategies
si ∈ Si. And the only interaction with other players happens on the
level of payoffs, since the payoff function Hi of the player i ∈ P is
defined on the set S of aggregated strategies, thus it can depend on
the strategy choices of the other players.
However, as we shall see in Remarks 2 - 4 below, in the case of n ≥ 3
players, this independence of the players is only apparent, when seen in
the framework the concept of Nash-equilibrium, and the corresponding
celebrated Nash theorem.

Before considering certain concepts of equilibrium, it is useful to intro-
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duce some notation. Given an aggregate strategy s = (si | i ∈ P ) ∈ S
and a player j ∈ P , we denote by s−j what remains from s when we
delete sj . In other words s−j = (si | i ∈ P \ {j}). Given now any
s ′j ∈ Sj, we denote by (s−j, s
′
j) the aggregate strategy (ti | i ∈ P ) ∈ S,
where ti = si, for i ∈ P \ {j}, and tj = s
′
j , for i = j.
For every given player j ∈ P , an obvious concept of best strategy
s∗j ∈ Sj is one which has the equilibrium property that
(2.3) Hj(s−j, s
∗
j) ≥ Hj(s−j, sj), for all s ∈ S, sj ∈ Sj
Indeed, it is obvious that any given player j ∈ P becomes completely
independent of all the other players, if he or she chooses such a best
strategy. However, as it turns out, and is well known, Rasmusen, very
few games of interest have such strategies.
Consequently, each of the players is in general vulnerable to the other
players, and therefore must try to figure out the consequences of all
the possible actions of all the other players.
Furthermore, even when such strategies exist, it can easily happen
that they lead to payoffs which are significantly lower than those that
may be obtained by suitable cooperation. A good example in this
regard is given by game called the Prisoner’s Dilemma, see section 3.
Remark 2
It is precisely due to the mentioned vulnerability of players, which is
typically present in most of the games in (2.1), that there may arise
an interest in cooperation between the players. A further argument
for cooperation comes from the larger payoff individual players may
consequently obtain. A formulation of such a cooperation, however,
must then come in addition to the simple and general structure present
in (2.1), since it is obviously not already contained explicitly in that
structure.

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Being obliged to give up in practice on the concept of best strategy
in (2.3), Nash suggested the following alternative concept which obvi-
ously is much weaker.
Definition ( Nash )
An aggregate strategy s∗ = (s∗i | i ∈ P ) ∈ S is called a Nash-
equilibrium, if no single player j ∈ P has the incentive to change
all alone his or her strategy s∗j ∈ Sj , in other words, if
(2.4) Hj(s
∗) ≥ Hj(s
∗
−j, sj), for all j ∈ P, sj ∈ Sj
Remark 3
Clearly, the Nash-equilibrium only considers the situation when never
more than one single player does at any given time deviate from his
or her respective strategy. Therefore, the Nash-equilibrium concept
is not able to deal with the situation when there are n ≥ 3 players,
and at some moment, more than one of them deviates from his or her
Nash-equilibrium strategy.
Needless to say, this fact renders the concept of Nash-equilibrium un-
realistically particular, and as such, also unstable or fragile.
Furthermore, that assumption has a manifestly, even if somewhat im-
plicitly and subtly, cooperative nature.
Above all, however, the larger the number n ≥ 3 of players, the less
realistic is that assumption in practical cases.
It is obvious, on the other hand, that when there are n ≥ 3 players,
in case at least two players change their Nash-equilibrium strategies,
the game may open up to a large variety of other possibilities in which
some of the players may happen to increase their payoffs.
Therefore, when constrained within the context of the Nash-equilibrium
concept, the game becomes cooperative by necessity, since the follow-
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ing dichotomy opens up inevitably :
Either
• (C1) All the players agree that never more than one single
player may change his or her Nash-equilibrium strategy,
Or
• (C2) Two or more players can set up one or more coalitions,
and some of them may change their Nash-equilibrium
strategies in order to increase their payoffs.
Consequently, what is usually seen as the essentially non-cooperative
nature of the game (2.1), turns out, when seen within the framework
of the Nash-equilibrium concept, to be based - even if tacitly and im-
plicitly - on the very strong cooperative assumption (C1) in the above
dichotomy.
On the other hand, in case (C1) is rejected, then the game falls out of
the Nash-equilibrium framework, and thus it opens up to the wealth
of possibilities under (C2), which among others, can contain a large
variety of possible ways of cooperation.
In this way, both the Nash-equilibrium concept and the Nash theo-
rem on the existence of the respective equilibrium in mixed strategies
are highly unstable or fragile when there are 3 or more players involved.
Also, similar with the best strategies in (2.3), with the Nash-equilibrium
strategies as well it can happen that they lead to payoffs which are
significantly lower than those that may be obtained by suitable coop-
eration.

As in the particular case of (2.1) which gives the von Neumann Min-
Max theorem on two person zero sum games, so with the weakened
concept of Nash-equilibrium in (2.4), such an equilibrium will in gen-
eral not exist, unless one embeds the pure strategy game (2.1) into its
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extension given by the following mixed strategy game
(2.5) µG = (P, (µSi | i ∈ P ), (µHi | i ∈ P ))
Here, for i ∈ P , the set µSi has as elements all the probability dis-
tributions σi : Si −→ [0, 1], thus with Σsi∈Si σi(si) = 1. Let us now
denote
(2.6) µS =
∏
i∈P µSi
Then for i ∈ P we have the payoff function µHi : µS −→ R given by
(2.7) µHi(σ) = Σs∈S σ(s)Hi(s)
where for σ = (σi | i ∈ P ) ∈ µS and s = (si | i ∈ P ) ∈ S, we define
σ(s) =
∏
i∈P σi(si).
Now the definition (2.4) of Nash-equilibrium for pure strategy games
(2.1) extends in an obvious manner to the mixed strategy games (2.5),
and then, with the above we have, see Vorob’ev
Theorem ( Nash)
The mixed strategy extension µG = (P, (µSi | i ∈ P ), (µHi | i ∈ P ))
of every pure strategy game G = (P, (Si | i ∈ P ), (Hi | i ∈ P )), has
at least one Nash-equilibrium strategy.
Remark 4
Obviously, what was mentioned in Remarks 2 and 3 related to the
inevitability of cooperation when the pure strategy games (2.1) are
considered within the framework Nash-equilibrium, will also hold for
the mixed strategy games (2.5), and thus as well for the above theorem
of Nash.
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Remark 5
The idea behind the Nash Program to reduce cooperative games to
noncooperative ones seems at first quite natural. Indeed, in its very
essence, a game means that, no matter what the rules of the game are,
each player has a certain freedom to act within those rules, and can
do so independently of all the other players. Therefore, it may appear
that if we only concentrate on that freedom and independence, then
within that context one can see the game as noncooperative, that be-
ing one of the usual ways to understand the very meaning of freedom
and independence.
Furthermore, even if one cooperates, one is still supposed to be left in
a game with a certain freedom and independence. Thus it may still
appear that, after subtracting all what is due to the rules of the game
and to one’s possible cooperation, one is still supposed to remain with
a certain freedom and independence.
According to Nash himself, it could be possible to express all commu-
nication and bargaining in a cooperative game in a formal manner,
thus turn the resulting freedom and independence of the players into
moves in an extended noncooperative game, in which the payoffs are
also extended accordingly. Since such a program has never been fully
implemented in all its details and only its ideas were presented, its crit-
icism must unavoidably remain on the same level of ideas. However,
a certain relevant and well tested objection can be made nevertheless,
see McKinsey [p. 359] :
” It is extremely difficult in practice to introduce into the cooperative
games the moves corresponding to negotiations in a way which will
reflect all the infinite variety permissible in the cooperative game, and
to do this without giving one player an artificial advantage ( because
of his having the first chance to make an offer, let us say ).”
What is lost, however, in such a view as the Nash Program is that
an appropriate voluntary and mutual limitation of one’s freedom and
independence, in order to implement a cooperation can significantly
change the payoffs, and thus it can offer to players an increase in their
payoffs, an increase which simply cannot be attained in any other non-
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cooperative way. And this is precisely the point in cooperation.
On the other hand, precisely to the extent that the above objection
in McKinsey is valid related to the Nash Program, and all subsequent
experience points to its validity, the very same objection touches es-
sentially on any attempt to reconsider cooperation, and do so in more
formal ways.
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